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        NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
___________ 
 
No. 12-3695 
___________ 
 
FRANCISCO ALFARO, 
                        Petitioner 
 
v. 
 
ATTORNEY GENERAL UNITED  
STATES OF AMERICA, 
                        Respondent 
 
____________________________________ 
 
On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
Board of Immigration Appeals 
(Agency No. A205-017-225) 
Immigration Judge:  Honorable Leo A. Finston 
____________________________________ 
 
Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
May 1, 2013 
Before:  AMBRO, HARDIMAN and ALDISERT, Circuit 
 
Judges 
(Opinion filed:  May 6, 2013) 
___________ 
 
OPINION 
___________ 
 
PER CURIAM 
 Immigration proceedings were initiated against Francisco Alfaro, a native and 
citizen of Costa Rica, after he pled guilty to and was convicted of falsely representing 
himself to be a United States citizen for the purpose of obtaining a passport in violation 
2 
 
of 18 U.S.C. § 1542.1  United States v. Alfaro
 Although Alfaro, proceeding pro se, claims that he was lawfully admitted to the 
United States in 1994, the Department of Homeland Security was unable to verify this 
claim.  The Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Alfaro did not sufficiently 
demonstrate that his admission to the United States was lawful, and therefore found him 
to be inadmissible on the first ground of the notice to appear.  Alfaro admitted that he had 
represented himself to be a citizen of the United States in order to obtain a United States 
passport and that he had been convicted of violating 18 U.S.C. § 1542, A.R. 201-202, and 
the IJ therefore found him to be inadmissible on the remaining grounds.  The IJ also 
determined that Alfaro was ineligible for waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(h), and ordered his removal.  The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed 
his appeal, and he now petitions for review.   
, Crim. No. 11-0835 (D.N.J. Mar. 14, 
2012).  Alfaro was thereafter served with a Notice to Appear charging him as 
inadmissible on three grounds: (1) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i), as an alien 
present in the United States without being admitted or paroled; (2) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 
§ 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), as an alien who has been convicted of a crime involving moral 
turpitude; and (3) pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii), as an alien who falsely 
represents himself to be a U.S. citizen for a purpose or benefit under the Immigration and 
Nationality Act.   
                                              
1 Alfaro was previously convicted of reckless manslaughter in violation of N.J. Rev. Stat. 
§ 2C:11-4B (1). 
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 We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(1).2  Abdulai v. Ashcroft, 239 F.3d 
542, 547 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review factual findings under a substantial evidence 
standard and, under that standard, we must uphold the agency’s decision unless the 
evidence not only supports a contrary conclusion, but compels it.  See Abdille v. 
Ashcroft, 242 F.3d 477, 483-84 (3d Cir. 2001).  We review the BIA’s conclusions of law 
de novo.  Filja v. Gonzales
 Alfaro argues that he was lawfully admitted to the United States and therefore 
should not have been charged as inadmissible.  Because he did not contest his alienage, 
he bore the burden to demonstrate, “by clear and convincing evidence, that [he was] 
lawfully present in the United States pursuant to a prior admission.”  8 U.S.C. 
§ 1229a(c)(2)(B).  Alfaro has conceded that the evidence he submitted was insufficient to 
meet that burden.  Petitioner’s Brief at 14.  At most, the documents he proffered indicate 
that he entered the United States in 1994; they offer no insight as to whether he was 
admitted or paroled.
, 447 F.3d 241, 251 (3d Cir. 2006). 
3
                                              
2 After the dismissal of his appeal but prior to filing the instant petition for review, Alfaro 
filed a motion to reconsider with the BIA.  The BIA denied the motion to reconsider on 
November 9, 2012, and Alfaro did not petition for review of that denial.  Our review of 
the present case is therefore limited to the BIA’s September 10, 2012 dismissal of his 
appeal.  Alfaro was removed to Costa Rica on September 25, 2012, but his removal does 
not affect our jurisdiction.  See Nken v. Holder, 556 U.S. 418, 435 (2009). 
  Accordingly, we are not compelled to disagree with the BIA’s 
 
3 Alfaro argues that he was prevented from presenting testimony from his grandmother 
regarding the status of his entry to the United States at a May 22, 2012 hearing.  That 
hearing was continued to allow the government an opportunity to investigate the status of 
his entry, which was to be resolved at a subsequent hearing on June 5.  However, 
although Alfaro notes that his grandmother was also present at that hearing, he offers no 
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conclusions that Alfaro did not carry his burden and that the evidence he submitted on 
appeal did not justify reopening proceedings.  8 C.F.R. § 1003.2(c).   We agree with the 
BIA that Alfaro was ineligible for a waiver of inadmissibility under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(h).  
Although that provision provides that the Attorney General has discretion to waive the 
application of certain grounds of inadmissibility, it does not apply to two of the grounds 
for which he was found to be inadmissible: as an alien present in the United States 
without being admitted or paroled under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(A)(i) and as an alien who 
falsely represents himself to be a United States citizen under § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii).  We will 
therefore deny the petition for review.4
                                                                                                                                                  
indication why he did not attempt to present her testimony at that time nor does he claim 
that he was prevented from doing so.  
 
 
 4 Alfaro’s argument that 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(6)(C)(ii) is a ground for inadmissibility but 
not removability is without merit.  Because he did not demonstrate that his entry to the 
United States was lawful, he was appropriately charged as inadmissible rather than 
removable.  See In re Rosas-Ramirez, 22 I. & N. Dec. 616, 620–21 (BIA 1999).  Aliens 
deemed inadmissible under § 1182 are removable.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1229a(e)(2) (defining 
the term “removable”).  We have thoroughly reviewed the record in this case and find 
that Alfaro’s claim of bias on the part of the IJ and BIA is also meritless.  We need not 
address Alfaro’s remaining arguments regarding whether his conviction under 18 U.S.C. 
§ 1542 is final for immigration purposes or constitutes a crime involving moral turpitude.  
The BIA’s conclusion that Alfaro was inadmissible and removable was correct for the 
reasons we have described and did not render Alfaro ineligible for any form of relief that 
might otherwise have been available to him.  Accordingly, any errors in other aspects of 
the BIA’s decision would therefore have been harmless.  Li Hua Yuan v. Att’y Gen., 642 
F.3d 420, 427 (3d Cir. 2011). 
